Agent-Skills.md

Agent Skills: security-review

Run an adversarial security audit using STRIDE, OWASP, supply-chain checks, secrets scans, and auth analysis. Use when changes touch auth, input parsing, dependencies, or network I/O, or before a production release.

UncategorizedID: OutlineDriven/odin-claude-plugin/security-review

Repository

OutlineDriven/odin-claude-plugin
OutlineDrivenLicense: Apache-2.0
32

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pnpm dlx add-skill https://github.com/OutlineDriven/odin-claude-plugin/tree/HEAD/skills/security-review

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skills/security-review/SKILL.md

Skill Metadata

Name
security-review
Description
Run an adversarial security audit using STRIDE, OWASP, supply-chain checks, secrets scans, and auth analysis. Use when changes touch auth, input parsing, dependencies, or network I/O, or before a production release.

Threat modeling is hypothesis generation for an adversary. Walk the change set as the attacker would: where does untrusted input enter, what trust boundary does it cross, what does it gain on the other side. Every unaudited path is a free move for the attacker.

When to Apply / NOT

Apply: new external surface (HTTP route, RPC method, file upload); AuthN/AuthZ change; deserialization / parsing of untrusted input; new dependency or major-version upgrade; cryptographic change; pre-release of public-facing service; incident postmortem.

NOT apply: internal refactor with no trust-boundary delta; pure performance work; documentation-only changes; internal-only experimental code.

Anti-patterns

  • Allowlist-by-omission: treating "no obvious issue" as "secure".
  • Trust the client: validating only client-side.
  • Logging secrets: tokens, PII, session cookies in logs.
  • Default-permit ACL: authorization checks on opt-in basis.
  • Magic-string config: secrets in source / env files.
  • Outdated SBOM: stale dependency snapshots.
  • Skipping the threat model: jumping to checklist without naming assets/actors/boundaries.

STRIDE Question Template

Apply each prompt to every component touched by the change.

| Letter | Threat | Required questions | |---|---|---| | S | Spoofing | Who is the principal? How is identity proven? Can the credential be forged, replayed, or stolen? Is MFA / mutual-auth enforced? | | T | Tampering | What inputs cross the trust boundary? Are they validated against an explicit schema (Zod / Pydantic / serde)? Are messages integrity-protected (HMAC / signature / TLS)? | | R | Repudiation | Are security-relevant actions logged with actor + timestamp + outcome? Are logs append-only / tamper-evident? | | I | Information Disclosure | What data is returned in error paths, logs, telemetry? Are PII / secrets ever serialized? Are timing side-channels addressed (constant-time compare)? | | D | Denial of Service | Are inputs bounded (size, count, depth)? Is parsing resource-limited (zip-bomb, billion-laughs, ReDoS)? Are external calls rate-limited? | | E | Elevation of Privilege | What privilege does the new code execute under? Is least privilege honored? Can input alter privilege (path traversal, SQL injection, deserialization gadget)? |

For each "yes" / "unclear" answer, file a finding with severity and remediation owner.

OWASP Top 10 (2021) Walkthrough

  1. Broken Access Control: git grep -n -C 3 'authorize\|@PreAuthorize\|require_role' then trace policy.
  2. Cryptographic Failures: git grep -n -E 'MD5|SHA1|DES|Random\(\)' for weak primitives. Use -E (extended regex) for alternation; -F (fixed-string) breaks the pipe-as-OR. Add ecosystem patterns as needed: Math.random, secrets.choice, Mersenne constants.
  3. Injection: ast-grep patterns for unparameterized queries / shell concat / template eval.
  4. Insecure Design: threat model walk; cross-check STRIDE.
  5. Security Misconfiguration: TLS / CORS / CSP / cookie flags / debug toggles.
  6. Vulnerable & Outdated Components: language-family CVE scanner.
  7. Identification & Authentication Failures: token TTL, refresh, session fixation, MFA.
  8. Software & Data Integrity Failures: lockfile pinned; signature-verified artifacts; CI provenance.
  9. Security Logging & Monitoring Failures: audit log coverage; alert on auth-fail / privilege-escalation.
  10. Server-Side Request Forgery: egress allowlist; SSRF guard on URL inputs.

Parallel Dep-Audit Tooling

Per-language-family CVE scanner, secrets/history scanner, and SBOM commands live in references/dep-audit-tooling.md — read the row for the ecosystem under audit; the other five families' rows are not needed for a single-stack codebase.

Use fd -e <ext> (not find). Use git grep -n -F 'literal' (not grep). Use bat -P -p -n (not cat).

Constitutional Rules

  1. Default deny.
  2. Validate at the trust boundary: schema-validate every input.
  3. Never roll your own crypto.
  4. No secrets in source: vault-only; enforce via gitleaks.
  5. Pin and verify: lockfiles checked in, integrity hashes enforced.
  6. Log security events: every AuthN/AuthZ outcome.
  7. Severity is a contract: Critical/high block merge.

Disambiguation

  • vs security-hardening: security-hardening applies OWASP prevention patterns at build time, while code is being written. security-review is the audit/assessment pass (STRIDE threat modeling, OWASP walkthrough, dependency audit) run against code that already exists.