Pentest Skill
[!IMPORTANT] PTES-aligned adversarial security audit for backend, frontend, and mobile applications. Produces a CVSS-scored Hacker Report with verified PoCs and phased remediation.
Optional args: slug=<feature>, ticket=<id/url>, mode=interactive|autonomous|channel, channel=<id>, auto_continue=true|false, profile=business|hybrid|technical.
Instructions
When the user asks to perform this workflow, execute the following steps:
π΅οΈββοΈ Penetration Test (PTES-Aligned)
Goal: Execute a red-team assessment across backend, frontend, and mobile targets with verified PoCs and audit-grade evidence.
Steps
-
Scope and authorization:
- Determine mode (
whitebox,greybox,blackbox) and targets. - Verify explicit, current authorization, target exclusions, permitted techniques, time window and stop contact. Require demonstrated runtime controls for live actions; unsupported controls block execution, not offline planning.
- Determine mode (
-
Intel and threat model:
- Identify stack, endpoints, parameters, local storage, schemes, and secrets.
- Use
common-security-audit,common-dast-tooling, and architecture docs when available. - Map trust boundaries, secrets, external integrations, and privileged workflows before exploit attempts.
-
Vulnerability analysis:
- Run scans and delegate: SAST/SCA to
specialist-aspm-correlator, dynamic/logic tospecialist-logic-hacker, binary/mobile tospecialist-mobile-reverser. - Rank targets by
exposure Γ sensitivity Γ auth_coverage.
- Run scans and delegate: SAST/SCA to
-
Exploit verification:
- Confirm findings only with reproducible evidence within scope; never force unsafe exploitation.
- Optional lab handoff: When verifying an exploit hypothesis against an isolated synthetic lab target, hand off to
cyber-lab-validationwith action-specific authorization and verified host isolation controls. - Prohibitions: Never target production/public assets, use real credentials, or exfiltrate real data.
- If active verification is blocked, refused, or unsupported, record step
blockedor findingnot-tested; continue independent threat modeling, code review, and remediation guidance without retrying with disguised prompts. - Preserve
suspected,blocked,not-testedandfalse-positivedispositions separately fromconfirmed; record missing evidence, preconditions and blast radius. - Use synthetic identities/data; no real sensitive-data extraction. Stop on scope drift or impact; obtain approval before restarting.
-
Reporting:
- Write
artifacts/security-review.mdwith assumptions, source provenance, review context, runtime contract, PoCs, blast radius, finding confidence, exploit path, evidence gaps, and handoff notes. - Emit
artifacts/security-review.dev.md,artifacts/security-review.appsec.md, orartifacts/security-review.exec.mdonly when leadership, client, or AppSec reporting is in scope. - Score from 100: Critical -25 (cap 25), High -15 (cap 40), Medium -8, Low -3.
- Reuse the existing
security-review.mdrecord when pentest follows earlier design or PR security review work. - Deliver findings in the standard template below.
- Write
Output Template
Executive Summary
- Hacker Score: X/100 ([Critical/Vulnerable/Moderate/Hardened])
- Target Scope: [repos, URLs, mobile apps]
- Findings: [Critical/High/Medium/Low counts]
Findings Table
| ID | Title | Platform | Severity | CVSS | CWE | PoC | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | SEC-01 | [title] | [backend|frontend|mobile] | [Critical|High|Medium|Low] | [score] | [CWE-id] | [Yes|No] |