TypeScript MCP on Cloudflare Workers
Last Updated: 2026-01-09 Versions: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.25.2, hono@4.11.3, zod@4.3.5 Spec Version: 2025-11-25
Quick Start
npm install @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@latest hono zod
npm install -D @cloudflare/workers-types wrangler typescript
Basic MCP Server:
import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js';
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { z } from 'zod';
const server = new McpServer({ name: 'my-mcp-server', version: '1.0.0' });
server.registerTool(
'echo',
{
description: 'Echoes back input',
inputSchema: z.object({ text: z.string() })
},
async ({ text }) => ({ content: [{ type: 'text', text }] })
);
const app = new Hono();
app.post('/mcp', async (c) => {
const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
enableJsonResponse: true
});
// CRITICAL: Close transport to prevent memory leaks
c.res.raw.on('close', () => transport.close());
await server.connect(transport);
await transport.handleRequest(c.req.raw, c.res.raw, await c.req.json());
return c.body(null);
});
export default app; // CRITICAL: Direct export, not { fetch: app.fetch }
Deploy: wrangler deploy
Authentication
API Key (KV-based):
app.use('/mcp', async (c, next) => {
const apiKey = c.req.header('Authorization')?.replace('Bearer ', '');
const isValid = await c.env.MCP_API_KEYS.get(`key:${apiKey}`);
if (!isValid) return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403);
await next();
});
Cloudflare Zero Trust:
const jwt = c.req.header('Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion');
const payload = await verifyJWT(jwt, c.env.CF_ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN);
Tasks (v1.24.0+)
Tasks enable long-running operations that return a handle for polling results later. Useful for expensive computations, batch processing, or operations that may need input.
Task States: working β input_required β completed / failed / cancelled
Server Capability Declaration:
const server = new McpServer({
name: 'my-server',
version: '1.0.0',
capabilities: {
tasks: {
list: {},
cancel: {},
requests: {
tools: { call: {} }
}
}
}
});
Tool with Task Support:
server.registerTool(
'long-running-analysis',
{
description: 'Analyze large dataset',
inputSchema: z.object({ datasetId: z.string() }),
execution: { taskSupport: 'optional' } // 'forbidden' | 'optional' | 'required'
},
async ({ datasetId }, extra) => {
// If invoked as task, extra.task contains taskId
const result = await performAnalysis(datasetId);
return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(result) }] };
}
);
Client Task Request:
{
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "long-running-analysis",
"arguments": { "datasetId": "abc123" },
"task": { "ttl": 60000 }
}
}
Task Lifecycle:
- Client sends request with
taskparam β receivestaskId - Client polls via
tasks/getwithtaskId - When status is
completed, client callstasks/resultto get output - Optional: Client can
tasks/cancelto abort
π Spec: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/utilities/tasks
Sampling with Tools (v1.24.0+)
Servers can now include tool definitions in sampling requests, enabling server-side agent loops.
Use Case: Server needs to orchestrate multi-step reasoning using LLM + tools without custom frameworks.
// Server initiates sampling with tools available
const result = await server.requestSampling({
messages: [{ role: 'user', content: 'Analyze this data and fetch more if needed' }],
maxTokens: 4096,
tools: [
{
name: 'fetch_data',
description: 'Fetch additional data from API',
inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: { query: { type: 'string' } } }
}
]
});
// Handle tool calls in response
if (result.content[0].type === 'tool_use') {
const toolResult = await executeLocalTool(result.content[0]);
// Continue conversation with tool result...
}
Key Points:
- Server-side agentic behavior as first-class MCP feature
- Standard MCP primitives (no custom frameworks)
- Tool definitions follow same schema as
tools/list
π Spec: SEP-1577
Cloudflare Service Tools
D1 Database:
server.registerTool('query-db', {
inputSchema: z.object({ query: z.string(), params: z.array(z.union([z.string(), z.number()])).optional() })
}, async ({ query, params }, env) => {
const result = await env.DB.prepare(query).bind(...(params || [])).all();
return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(result.results) }] };
});
KV, R2, Vectorize: See references/cloudflare-integration.md
Known Issues Prevention
This skill prevents 10+ production issues documented in official MCP SDK and Cloudflare repos:
Issue #1: Export Syntax Issues (CRITICAL)
Error: "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'map')"
Source: honojs/hono#3955, honojs/vite-plugins#237
Why It Happens: Incorrect export format with Vite build causes cryptic errors
Prevention:
// β WRONG - Causes cryptic build errors
export default { fetch: app.fetch };
// β
CORRECT - Direct export
export default app;
Issue #2: Unclosed Transport Connections
Error: Memory leaks, hanging connections Source: Best practice from SDK maintainers Why It Happens: Not closing StreamableHTTPServerTransport on request end Prevention:
app.post('/mcp', async (c) => {
const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport(/*...*/);
// CRITICAL: Always close on response end
c.res.raw.on('close', () => transport.close());
// ... handle request
});
Issue #3: Tool Schema Validation Failure
Error: ListTools request handler fails to generate inputSchema
Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#1028
Why It Happens: Zod schemas not properly converted to JSON Schema
Prevention:
// β
CORRECT - SDK handles Zod schema conversion automatically
server.registerTool(
'tool-name',
{
inputSchema: z.object({ a: z.number() })
},
handler
);
// No need for manual zodToJsonSchema() unless custom validation
Issue #4: Tool Arguments Not Passed to Handler
Error: Handler receives undefined arguments
Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#1026
Why It Happens: Schema type mismatch between registration and invocation
Prevention:
const schema = z.object({ a: z.number(), b: z.number() });
type Input = z.infer<typeof schema>;
server.registerTool(
'add',
{ inputSchema: schema },
async (args: Input) => {
// args.a and args.b properly typed and passed
return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: String(args.a + args.b) }] };
}
);
Issue #5: CORS Misconfiguration
Error: Browser clients can't connect to MCP server Source: Common production issue Why It Happens: Missing CORS headers for HTTP transport Prevention:
import { cors } from 'hono/cors';
app.use('/mcp', cors({
origin: ['http://localhost:3000', 'https://your-app.com'],
allowMethods: ['POST', 'OPTIONS'],
allowHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization']
}));
Issue #6: Missing Rate Limiting
Error: API abuse, DDoS vulnerability Source: Production security best practice Why It Happens: No rate limiting on MCP endpoints Prevention:
app.post('/mcp', async (c) => {
const ip = c.req.header('CF-Connecting-IP');
const rateLimitKey = `ratelimit:${ip}`;
const count = await c.env.CACHE.get(rateLimitKey);
if (count && parseInt(count) > 100) {
return c.json({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded' }, 429);
}
await c.env.CACHE.put(
rateLimitKey,
String((parseInt(count || '0') + 1)),
{ expirationTtl: 60 }
);
// Continue...
});
Issue #7: TypeScript Compilation Memory Issues
Error: Out of memory during tsc build
Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#985
Why It Happens: Large dependency tree in MCP SDK
Prevention:
# Add to package.json scripts
"build": "NODE_OPTIONS='--max-old-space-size=4096' tsc && vite build"
Issue #8: UriTemplate ReDoS Vulnerability
Error: Server hangs on malicious URI patterns Source: GitHub modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#965 (Security) Why It Happens: Regex denial-of-service in URI template parsing Prevention: Update to SDK v1.20.2 or later (includes fix)
Issue #9: Authentication Bypass
Error: Unauthenticated access to MCP tools Source: Production security best practice Why It Happens: Missing or improperly implemented authentication Prevention: Always implement authentication for production servers (see Authentication Patterns section)
Issue #10: Environment Variable Leakage
Error: Secrets exposed in error messages or logs Source: Cloudflare Workers security best practice Why It Happens: Environment variables logged or returned in responses Prevention:
// β WRONG - Exposes secrets
console.log('Env:', JSON.stringify(env));
// β
CORRECT - Never log env objects
try {
// ... use env.SECRET_KEY
} catch (error) {
// Don't include env in error context
console.error('Operation failed:', error.message);
}
Deployment
# Local
wrangler dev # http://localhost:8787/mcp
# Production
wrangler deploy
Testing: npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector (connect to http://localhost:8787/mcp)
Templates & References
Templates: basic-mcp-server.ts, tool-server.ts, resource-server.ts, authenticated-server.ts, tasks-server.ts, wrangler.jsonc
References: tool-patterns.md, authentication-guide.md, testing-guide.md, cloudflare-integration.md, common-errors.md
Critical Rules
Always:
- β
Close transport on response end (
c.res.raw.on('close', () => transport.close())) - β
Use direct export (
export default app, NOT{ fetch: app.fetch }) - β Implement authentication for production
- β Update to SDK v1.25.1+ for security fixes and Tasks support
Never:
- β Export with object wrapper
- β Forget to close StreamableHTTPServerTransport
- β Log environment variables or secrets
- β Use outdated SDK versions (<1.20.2 has ReDoS vulnerability)