Agent Skills: VirusTotal Reputation

Use when users ask to check a file/hash/URL/IP/domain with VirusTotal, confirm malware reputation, investigate possible false positives, or compare AV detections. Prefer hash-based lookup first and use Exa to find public VirusTotal report links.

UncategorizedID: plurigrid/asi/virustotal-reputation

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pnpm dlx add-skill https://github.com/plurigrid/asi/tree/HEAD/skills/virustotal-reputation

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skills/virustotal-reputation/SKILL.md

Skill Metadata

Name
virustotal-reputation
Description
Use when users ask to check a file/hash/URL/IP/domain with VirusTotal, confirm malware reputation, investigate possible false positives, or compare AV detections. Prefer hash-based lookup first and use Exa to find public VirusTotal report links.

VirusTotal Reputation

Perform structured VirusTotal-style reputation triage and report risk with explicit confidence.

Workflow

  1. Identify indicator type: sha256 (preferred), sha1/md5, filename+publisher, URL, domain, or IP.
  2. Perform hash-first discovery:
    • Query exact file hash first: site:virustotal.com/gui/file <hash>.
    • If hash is unavailable, query filename and correlate with vendor, signature, and date context.
  3. Search with Exa using mcp__exa__web_search_exa and prioritize direct VirusTotal GUI result URLs over reposts.
  4. Grade confidence:
    • High: exact hash match and consistent publisher context.
    • Medium: filename/context match without exact hash confirmation.
    • Low: no direct report match or conflicting context.
  5. Return verdict, confidence, evidence, and next verification action.

Query Patterns (Exa)

  • site:virustotal.com/gui/file <sha256>
  • "<filename>.exe" "virustotal.com/gui/file"
  • "<vendor>" "<filename>" "VirusTotal"
  • site:virustotal.com/gui/url <url>
  • site:virustotal.com/gui/domain <domain>
  • site:virustotal.com/gui/ip-address <ip>

Risk Interpretation

  • Treat low detections on properly signed vendor updater/firmware binaries as possible false positives.
  • Do not declare a sample "clean" based only on low or zero detections.
  • Elevate risk when any of the following exists:
    • signature is missing/invalid for expected publisher
    • path and execution context are inconsistent with legitimate updater behavior
    • parent process chain is unrelated or suspicious
    • sandbox behavior indicates credential theft, persistence, injection, or network beaconing

Privacy/Safety

  • Prefer hash lookups before file uploads.
  • Do not upload sensitive/private binaries unless user explicitly asks.
  • If uncertainty remains, recommend local hash/signature verification plus multi-source triage.

Quick Commands (User Device)

Windows PowerShell

Get-FileHash "C:\path\to\file.exe" -Algorithm SHA256
Get-AuthenticodeSignature "C:\path\to\file.exe" | Format-List Status,SignerCertificate

Windows CMD

certutil -hashfile "C:\path\to\file.exe" SHA256

Response Template

Verdict: <likely benign / suspicious / likely malicious> (confidence: <low|medium|high>)

Evidence:
1. <direct VT link or "no direct VT match">
2. <hash/signature/vendor correlation>
3. <detection context / recency / behavior notes>

Next step:
1. <specific command or verification action>