Agent-Skills.md

Agent Skills: CI security review (`/review:security-review`)

Perform a security architecture review with Zero Trust assessment - identifies authentication/authorization gaps, data protection issues, and provides remediation guidance

UncategorizedID: melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/security-review

Repository

melodic-software/claude-code-plugins
melodic-softwareLicense: MIT
417

Install this agent skill to your local

pnpm dlx add-skill https://github.com/melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/tree/HEAD/plugins/review/skills/security-review

Skill Files

Browse the full folder contents for security-review.

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plugins/review/skills/security-review/SKILL.md

Skill Metadata

Description
"CI security-review lane for a GitHub pull request — logic, trust-boundary, and Actions security findings static analysis misses. Use when: 'CI security review', 'claude-security-review lane', '/review:security-review', or a reusable workflow invokes the org security-review plugin command."

CI security review (/review:security-review)

Org-owned security review logic for the claude-security-review reusable workflow (ci-workflows#258). Built-in /security-review is unusable in CI (origin/HEAD unresolvable under the Actions checkout action; cannot post) — this org-authored skill is the CI path. The lane wrapper supplies REPO / PR NUMBER / HEAD SHA and installs the inline-comment MCP server via claude_args; this skill owns what to hunt for.

Gotchas

  • Skill frontmatter cannot install the inline-comment MCP server — only the action's claude_args can. Rely on the wrapper grant.
  • Do not use a stale 0–100 confidence-score tuning line. Prefer adversarial validation (producer ≠ verifier) for candidate findings.
  • Report security issues only — no style, naming, test-coverage, or general code-quality commentary (that is /review:code-review).

Skip gate (cheap)

Before deep review, stop early when any of these hold (say so plainly and post nothing else):

  1. PR is closed or not open
  2. Change has no security-relevant surface after reading the diff
  3. This head already has a successful security review that still applies

Criteria

Perform a security review of THIS pull request. Review ONLY the files changed in this PR: use gh pr diff to see what changed, then read those files. Do not audit unrelated parts of the codebase.

Hunt for vulnerabilities that static analysis misses: logic flaws, authorization and access-control gaps, injection surfaces (command, SQL, path, template), unsafe handling of tokens / secrets / credentials, and dangerous GitHub Actions patterns — pull_request_target or workflow_run used with secrets over untrusted code, script injection through the github context inside run: blocks, permission-widening changes to a workflow's permissions: or to settings / config, and supply-chain risk from loosened or unpinned action / dependency pins.

Tag each finding with a severity (CRITICAL / IMPORTANT / SUGGESTION). Defer to zizmor's advisory lane for what it already covers statically — supply-chain / unpinned-action risk, dangerous trigger patterns, excessive permissions, and template injection: do not re-report those findings here. This lane's value is the logic, architecture, data-flow, and trust-boundary security reasoning static analysis cannot reach. If you find no security issues, say so plainly.

High-signal bar

Exclude pre-existing issues, linter-catchable noise, and generic security advice without a concrete exploitable path in this diff. Committable suggestion fences (GitHub suggestion code blocks) only when the suggestion alone fully fixes the anchored finding.

Adversarial validation (V2 target)

When fanning out hunters, validate each surviving candidate with a separate verifier subagent (producer ≠ verifier). Drop rejected candidates.

Reporting

Use the inline-comment tool the wrapper granted to anchor each finding to the changed line it concerns. Cross-file / whole-PR findings go in the summary with commit-blob permalinks using the supplied HEAD SHA.